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Utilizing a simple growth model that includes the energy resource 
as an essential input, the possibility of a cleaner environment as 
well as larger income is demonstrated. Growth rates need not be 
lowered to have a cleaner environment, and the energy output ratio 
may be reduced. Pollution generated as side effects makes it neces- 
sary for policy makers to come up with suitable policies. In this regard, 
several policy options are proposed. Pollution tax (more generally, 
an environment tax) and a subsidy for energy and anti-pollution 
(environment) related technological progresses are such examples. A 
judicious mix of those policies can make income larger, energy usage 
smaller, and pollution level lower.
Keywords: Growth, Energy uses, Environment, Green growth, 
Environment (energy or green) tax, Technological 
progress
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I. Introduction
Is it possible to achieve increases in income without compromising 
(or, better still, while improving) environmental qualities? Are lower 
growth rates an unavoidable price to pay to have a better environment? 
Is ever increasing energy input needed to sustain economic growth? 
Mixed views exist on these issues. 
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Regarding the first question, two opposing views are observed. One 
group of scholars (notably, environmentalists) argues that environmental 
values are routinely sacrificed in the pursuit of greater wealth, which, 
they argue, is wrong. They would rather pursue no growth or negative 
growth goals to better promote environmental values (Meadows et al. 
2004). As evidence for the seemingly inevitable trade-off between growth 
and environment, they cite the finding that when countries start to grow 
vigorously, their environments tend to deteriorate very rapidly. The other 
group (notably, economists), however, argues that growth need not be 
sacrificed to better protect the environment. They point out that once past 
the threshold level, further income growth is accompanied by a steady 
improvement in the environment. Thus, they argue, advanced countries 
have not only higher income, but also a cleaner environment.1
Regarding the second question, environmentalists as well as econo- 
mists acknowledge a negative relation between environmental qualities 
and growth rates. Countries with above average growth rates tend to 
have environments worse than average, and countries with environments 
better than average tend to have lower than average growth rates. Al- 
though they agree on the observation, their interpretations are different. 
Environmentalists consider the relation as causal; lower growth rates 
lead to cleaner environment. If we want to have cleaner environment, 
they argue that we must prepare to accept lower growth rates (Daly and 
Townsend 1993; Norton 2005). Economists regard this observation as 
just a correlation, and do not attribute causal relations to them. As 
such, they contend that lower growth rates do not necessarily lead to a 
cleaner environment, nor does pursuing a cleaner environment neces- 
sitate lower growth rates (Ekins 2000; Lee 2010).
Regarding the third issue, most scholars agree that income growth 
necessitates an increased usage of resources, that most of these re- 
sources are non-renewable hence exhaustible, and that someday they 
may run out. The possibility for resources to run out impels scholars to 
seek solutions. Again, there are different views on this issue. Most econo- 
mists seek ways to reduce resource usages, to better utilize resources, 
and to come up with alternative and possibly renewable resources. They 
do not see the urgent need to forego economic growth (Chung and Quah 
2010). However, most environmentalists see the situation as one more 
1 In terms of the environmental Kuznets curve, environmentalists seem to focus 
on the initial phase, whereas economists seem to focus on the latter phase, of 
income growth.
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reason for pursuing moderate or negative growth strategies. They suggest 
that we cannot avoid resource shortages, unless we forego growth targets 
(see Meadows et al. 2004; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2008). 
Resource usage, particularly the use of fossil fuels, entails additional 
problems: They emit greenhouse gases. Accumulation of greenhouse 
gases, if unchecked in time, could lead to global warming, which may 
cause severe weather disasters. Many scholars argue that this phenom- 
enon may upset the global climate system and seriously disrupt human 
lives. (For greenhouse gas problems in East Asia, see Iwami 2004.) Hence, 
they argue, dire needs to cut them down. But how can we do that? 
Economists propose to reduce fossil fuels uses, to better utilize them, 
and to come up with less (or no) greenhouse gas emitting alternatives. 
But environmentalists argue, yet again, that unless we forego growth 
targets, we cannot solve greenhouse gas problems. (For skeptical views 
on this, see Lomborg 1998.)
This is the second in a series of papers that deals with the aforemen- 
tioned issues in a unified framework. The first (Lee 2010), considers 
choice problems for decentralized agents who treat pollution as purely 
external. The present paper considers choice problems for a social planner 
who fully internalizes pollution. As both papers utilize identical frame- 
works, implications regarding growth and environment that we derive 
from them are the same. They demonstrate the possibility of achieving 
income growth without sacrificing environmental values, that there is 
no need to accept lower growth rates even when we aim for a cleaner 
environment, and that we can deal with greenhouse gas issues without 
sacrificing income growth targets. These implications are derived with a 
growth model in which energy resources play two roles: good and bad. 
The energy resources help produce outputs (good), but their use entails 
pollution (bad). 
Of course, not everything is identical. First of all, the resulting resource 
allocations are different. For example, when pollution is internalized, 
the per capita energy inputs, the per capita income, and the capita pol- 
lution all become smaller. However, the per capita green GDP, which is 
defined as the per capita income minus the per capita pollution, becomes 
larger. Although both output and pollution decrease, pollution decreases 
much more than income does.2
More importantly, in this study, we can discuss policy options that 
would induce citizens to fully internalize pollution. What is needed is to 
2 Here we assume that pollution is measured in units of output.
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get the prices of environmental resources correct. This move is necessary 
to redress “market failures” owing to externalities, tragedy of commons 
problems, and public goods aspects, associated with the use of environ- 
mental resources. Getting the prices correct can be done directly by 
imposing taxes a la Pigou on the use of environmental resources. Other- 
wise, the procedure can be done indirectly by promoting the development 
of energy-related and/or pollution-related technologies. 
The most important finding of our research is that, when we get the 
prices correct with appropriate taxes and, utilizing the tax revenues, when 
we foster the development of output production technologies, energy- 
related technologies, and pollution- (or more generally, environment-) 
related technologies, we can make income larger, energy input smaller, 
and pollution level lower.
The current study has the following components. In Chapter II, we 
propose a dynamic model of green growth and derive two alternative 
growth paths. One is a growth path derived under the assumption that 
agents behave as if pollution is completely external to their decision 
problems. The other is a growth path derived under the assumption that 
agents behave as if pollution is completely internal to their decision 
problems. In Chapter III, we discuss the aspects in which the two alter- 
natives are similar or dissimilar. In Chapter IV, a key chapter of this 
study, we investigate several policy alternatives that would induce agents 
to behave as if they are de facto fully internalizing pollution. Getting the 
prices right, promoting green R&D, imposing an eco-tax, subsidizing less 
polluting factors of input, and outright restrictions are policy alternatives 
we consider. Chapter V concludes the study.
II. A Model of Green Growth
This chapter investigates the kinds of steady state growth paths we 
can derive in a model where physical capital, human capital, and energy 
resources are indispensable factors of input. One essential aspect to 
consider here is the fact that the use of energy resources generates 
pollution. 
The important issue is not the fact that pollution is generated, but 
how pollution is treated by agents. If pollution is perceived by agents as 
completely external, they would not do anything about it. Consequently, 
they would use too much energy resources, and thereby would experience 
too much pollution. Citizens would likely behave in such a manner. 
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However, the public agents who are supposed to design and implement 
socially desirable policies cannot do the same. They must take pollution 
into account. If they do so and their policies are effective, a smaller 
amount of energy use and a smaller amount of pollution would result. 
The goal of the current paper is to propose the simplest possible growth 
model that can exhibit such outcomes. 
The present model, which investigates the dynamic relationship between 
economic growth and environment by focusing on energy use and the 
pollution generated from this use, is only a small example of the general 
class of models on economic growth and environment. More general 
models would treat physical, human, and environmental capital as state 
variables, and study how these state variables would behave as agents 
make relevant decisions for production, consumption, and investment.3
Environmental capital refers to natural objects, such as forest, soil, 
water, air, and mineral resources. Climate and geographical conditions 
of a country are also important constituents of environmental capital.
If the environmental capital is taken as a state variable, its evolution 
over time must be specified. The environmental capital of a country would 
change over time as a result of depletion and regeneration, use and 
destruction, and repair and investment. If the reduction of the envir- 
onmental capital due to depletion, destruction, and use is larger than 
the addition via regeneration, repair, and investment, the stock of en- 
vironmental capital would decline over time. In this case, the possibility 
that the environmental capital might run out should be a concern. Pol- 
lution tends to hasten the depletion process by making a substantial 
portion of the environmental capital less usable. 
Our model is much simpler in that we focus on one component of the 
environmental capital, energy resources, and we assume that one can 
buy any amount of energy resources in the global market. As we study 
the green growth problem of a small open economy, our problem is vastly 
simpler than the problems dealt with in more general models.4 
3 Many papers deal with economic growth and environment. See Taylor and 
Brock (2005) for an intelligent survey of recent literature.
4 See also Grossman and Krueger (1995), Kim (1996), and Stokey (1998) for a 
few examples of green growth models.
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A. Setup of the Model5
(a) Brief Description of Economic Activities
Consider an economy that consists of a large number of households 
and firms. Households determine how much to work, consume, and save. 
Firms decide how much to procure, produce, and invest. What firms buy 
as inputs is supplied by households (human capital and physical capital). 
What firms produce is sold to other consumers as consumption goods 
and capital goods.
Firms produce outputs using physical capital, human capital, and 
energy inputs, and sell the products to households. The physical capital 
and human capital are rented from households, and energy inputs are 
purchased in the global market.
Households lease physical capital and human capital to firms and, in 
return, get labor income and asset income. With this income, households 
buy consumption goods and capital goods. Buying capital goods in this 
case amounts to household savings. Households use human capital for 
two purposes: to lease it to firms, and use it to accumulate human cap- 
ital. From the portion leased to firms, households get current income. 
From the portion used for human capital accumulation, households get 
future income.
From the revenue made, firms first pay the costs of energy purchased 
in the global markets. From the remainder, firms pay the rental fees for 
the physical capital and human capital leased from the households. 
Profits, if any, are also returned to the households as dividends. As a 
result, the total revenue minus the energy cost is nothing but the in- 
come of households. Households use this income for consumption and 
savings/investment.
Four markets are in operation here: a market for human capital, phys- 
ical capital, energy inputs, and outputs. The energy market is external 
to the economy. The other three markets are competitively operated. 
When we normalize output price, we have real wage and real interest rate 
as endogenous prices to determine. We do not consider international 
trade, except for the importation of the energy inputs. Until we study 
the public choice problems, we do not include a government in our model.
Three time-varying components exist in the economy. First, population 
grows at the rate of n. Second, human capital grows as a result of human 
capital investment. Third, physical capital grows as a result of physical 
5 The model and the procedure to derive the balanced growth solutions are 
essentially the same as those obtained in Lee (2010).
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capital investment. In addition, technological progress may be included. 
However, for simplicity, we assume the level of technology as fixed and 
given. The total income of the economy would grow as a result of the 
growth in physical capital per person, human capital per person, and 
the population. The per capita income would grow as a result of the 
growth in physical capital per person and human capital per person.6
(b) Decision Problem of Households
Each household has L(t) members. Each member “owns” human capital 
h(t), and hence the total owned by a household is H(t)＝h(t)L(t). (We 
will drop the time variable “t,” unless it is needed explicitly.) The human 
capital is attached to the worker, and the two cannot be separated. That 
is, h is used always together with L. (In principle many households exist. 
Nevertheless, without loss of generality, we normalize households to one.) 
The member of households L, which is the population when the normal- 
ization is made, grows at an exogenous population growth rate n.
The household uses its human capital H＝hL for two purposes. uhL 
is leased to firms in return for wages w, and (1－u)hL is used for human 
capital accumulation. The labor income a household earns is wuhL. In 
addition, the household owns physical capital Q, which the household 
rents out to firms, and from which the household receives a rental 
income RQ. The household uses total income wuhL＋RQ for consump- 
tion C and gross physical capital accumulation δQ＋Q̇. Here δQ is de- 
preciation, and Q̇ is net addition to physical capital.
Reflecting these, we can represent the budget constraint of the house- 
hold as:
C＋Q̇＋δQ＝RQ＋wuhL                       (1)
The human capital of the household grows according to the following:
H ̇＝ξ (1－u)H                           (2)
(1－u)H is the amount of human capital used for human capital accu- 
mulation (new human capital is produced using existing human capital 
as an input), and the parameter ξ  stands for the productivity of human 
capital production. ξ  is assumed to be exogenously given. Finally, we 
assume 0≤u≤1 and ξ＞0.
6 Here we assume that everyone who is alive works.
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We use a conventional constant elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 
utility function. θ  is a parameter related to the elasticity of substitution, 
and ρ  is the time discount rate.
(c) Decision Problem of Firms
A large number of identical firms exist. The production function of the 
firm j is as follows:
α
φ φ αφ −= + 1[ ( ) ] [( ) ]j j j j j jY A K B X uhL                   (4)
Kj stands for the physical capital, and Xj for the energy resources used 
as inputs by the firm j. Likewise, (uhL) j stands for the human capital 
input used by the firm j. Aj stands for the productivity of the output 
production, and Bj for the effectiveness of energy inputs. The larger Aj 
is, the higher is the output production productivity. Similarly, the higher 
Bj is, the more effective are the energy inputs. (Bj Xj), not Xj, enters into 
the production function as inputs.7 Finally, α  and φ  are parameters of 
the production function. We assume that 0≤α≤1 and φ＞0.
We will use the same functional form for the aggregate production func- 
tion, as we are not concerned about industrial organization issues. The 
aggregate production function is given by the following:
α
φ φ αφ −= + 1[ ( ) ] [( )]Y A K BX uhL                     (5)
All variables are economy-wide aggregates. For example, A stands for 
the overall productivity level of the economy, and B stands for the 
economy-wide productivity related to the efficient use of energy inputs. 
When A gets larger, an equal amount of inputs would produce a larger 
amount of outputs. When B gets larger, an equal amount of energy input 
X would contribute more to output production.
7 X and BX may be viewed as “raw” and “processed” energy, respectively.
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As can be seen from Equation (5), the final output Y is produced 
using physical capital K, effective (or processed) energy (BX ), and human 
capital uhL. The function is the constant elasticity of substitution in K 
and BX, and a Cobb-Douglas in the mix of K & (BX ) and human capital 
uhL＝uH. The production function (5) is constant returns to scale in K, 
(BX ), and L. However, what is used for production is hL and not L. 
Thus, in terms of K, (BX ), L, and h, the production function exhibits an 
increasing return to scale property.
(d) Pollution
We assume a very simple mechanism for pollution generation. Thus, 
pollution Z is generated when energy resources are used in production. 
Pollution is generated not only during the production process, but also 
during the entire process of production, delivery, and consumption of 
goods and services. Furthermore, many instances of pollution are being 
generated during production processes even when resources other than 
energy are used. Nevertheless, in this paper we assume the following 
pollution generating function to simplify the discussion:
= 1Z X
D                                (6)
D indicates the level of technologies regarding pollution prevention and 
cleanup. The larger D is, the smaller the generation of pollution Z would 
be from a given amount of energy use X. When we measure Z in units 
of Y, Y－Z becomes a measure for net outputs. (This is usually called 
the green GDP.)
B. Derivation of solutions
(a) Decentralized Agents’ Problems and Solutions: When Pollution Is 
Ignored
This part of the problem is identical to that studied in Lee (2010); 
hence, we will simply state the problem and summarize the steady state 












                      (7)
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Subject to:
α
φ φ αφ δ−= + − − + −1[ ( ) ] ( ) ( ) ( )xk A k Bx uh c n k p Bx            (8)
h ̇＝[ξ (1－u )－n ]h                          (9)
c≧0, 0≦u≦1 and k≧0, h≧0                  (10)
where ρ ̃＝ρ－n＞0, 0＜α＜1, θ , φ , ξ＞0, A＞0, B＞0, k(0)＞0, h(0)＞0 are 
given. The energy price px is determined in the global market, hence is 
given for domestic consumer-producers. The small letters stand for per 
capita values of each variable. For example, c stands for C/L.
The steady state solutions for the problem are as follows:8
* nu ρ ξ θξ θ
θξ
− + −=
                         
(11)
* *[ ( )]c n kξ δ ρ ξ δ
α θ
+ −= + − +
                    
(12)
*
* *( )(1 )[ ]y kξ δ η
α
+ +=








* * * *1 1 ( )
x
x k k











−⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠                      
(15)
Tilde variables stand for the amount per effective worker. For example, 
c̃＝c/h＝C/(hL). In (13) to (15), the variable η * is given as follows:
8 See Lee (2010) for a formal derivation of the solutions.






−⎛ ⎞+= ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠                            
(16)
Note that η * is increasing in ξ  and decreasing in px. Finally, pollution 
per effective worker, z̃＝Z/(hL), is determined as follows:
φη=
1
* *1 ( )z k
BD                           
(17)
(b) A Social Planner’s Problem and Its Solutions: When Pollution Is Fully 
Internalized.











                      
(18)
Subject to:
1 1[ ( ) ] ( ) ( ) ( )( )xk A k Bx uh c n k p BxBD
α
φ φ αφ δ−= + − − + − +
       
(19)
ḣ＝[ξ (1－u)－n]h                        (20)
c≧0, 0≦u≦1 and k≧0, h≧0                 (21)
where ρ ̃＝ρ－n＞0, 0＜α＜1, θ , φ , ξ＞0, A＞0, B＞0, k(0)＞0, h(0)＞0 are 
given. 
The social planner’s problem is almost identical to that of the decen- 
tralized agents. In fact, Equations (18), (20), and (21) are exactly the same 
as Equations (7), (9), and (10). However, there is a crucial difference 
between Equations (8) and (19). The decentralized agents regard only 
the market price px as the price of the processed energy input (Bx), 
whereas the social planner takes the cost of pollution 1/BD into account, 
too. Thus for the social planner, the price of the processed energy input 
(Bx) becomes (px＋1/BD). In essence, the social planner maximizes the 
net profit, whereas decentralized agents maximize the gross profit. (Gross 
profit minus the cost of pollution is the net profit.)
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The steady state solutions for the social planner’s problem are as fol- 
lows:
** nu ρ ξ θξ θ
θξ
− + −=
                       (22)
** **
** **(1 )( )[ ( )]c n kαη η ξ δ ρ ξ δ
α θ
− + + −= + − +
           (23)
**
** **( )(1 )[ ]y kξ δ η
α
+ +=




































** ** ** ** **1 1 1 ( )1
x
z x k k
D BD BDp
BD            
(27)
These solutions again look exactly the same as those for the private 
agents. Nevertheless, the similarity is misleading. The η ** that enters 
Equations (23) to (27) differs from the η * that enters Equations (12) to 
(15) and (17); hence, the social planner’s choices for consumption, output, 
energy input, capital stock, and pollution are different from those for 





xp BD                           
(28)
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Recall that for η *, the denominator in the bracket is px, whereas for 
η **, it is (px)’＝px＋1/BD. Given that the latter’s denominator is larger 
than that for the former, it is evident that η ** is smaller than η *. That 
is, the social planner makes choices so that the key variable η  becomes 
smaller than what would entail under private choices.
III. Characterization of the Steady State Solutions
We investigate the properties of the steady state solutions just derived. 
Recall that there are two sets of solutions: one for private choices and 
the other for social choice. 
A. Cases When the Solutions Coincide
For several variables, their long run steady state values are identical. 
The human capital allocation variable u, the long run steady state growth 
rate (of output) g, and the long run real interest rate r are such vari- 
ables.9
(a) Human Capital Allocation
Equations (11) and (22) are solutions for u for the two cases. Observe 
that u* is the same as u**. This condition shows that the allocation rule 
for human capital between “work” and “learning” is invariant to whether 
or not pollution is internalized. That is, regardless of whether the price 
of effective energy is px or (px)’＝px＋1/BD, the economy would end up 
dividing human capital in an identical manner.
Observe that u*＝u** is decreasing in ξ  and θ , and increasing in (ρ－
n). When human capital-forming activities become more productive (ξ gets 
larger), people would allocate more of their human capital to such 
activities (1－u* becomes larger). Likewise, when people become more 
time impatient (ρ  gets smaller) and/or more willing to substitute inter- 
temporally (θ  becomes smaller), they will put more human capital into 
human-capital forming activities (1－u* becomes larger). 
(b) Long Run Growth Rate
Recall that the output per effective worker ỹ was defined as Y/hL＝
y/h. Therefore, we have y＝ỹh. This suggests that the per capita income 
9 The results discussed here could be due to the specificity of the model. Fur- 
ther study is needed to check whether the results go through in a wider class of 
models.
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would grow at the rate given below. 
ξ= = + = + − −( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [1 ( )]y y h yg t t t t u t n
y y h y              
(29)
In the long run, as the economy moves toward the steady state growth 
path, the growth rate of ỹ converges to zero, and the growth rate of h 
converges to ξ (1－u*)－n, where u* is the long run value of u given in 




−= − − =* *[1 ]g u n
                     (30)
In (30), the second equality is derived by substituting u* given in (11). 
The output per effective worker ỹ would grow to ỹ* or ỹ**. However, once 
ỹ* reaches at ỹ* or ỹ**, it will not grow any further. Thus, the growth 
rate g(t) of y(t), starting from a value higher than g*, would steadily 
decline toward g*, which is nothing but the long run growth rate of 
human capital h. 
In this case too, the long run steady state growth rate g* is independent 
of the energy price px. Thus, as it was the case for u
*, whether energy 
prices are high or low will not affect the long run steady state growth 
rate of the economy. This phenomenon suggests that we would have the 
same long run growth rates regardless of whether we ignore or internalize 
pollution. Hence, there is no need to accept lower growth rates to have 
a cleaner environment.
In our model, as it is in other balanced growth models, c, k, x, z, and 
y all would grow at the same rate as h grows. That is, the long run 
steady state growth rate of c, k, x, and z would be identical to the long 
run steady state growth rate g* of y. 
(c) Long Run Real Interest Rate
We can infer how the real interest is determined from the equilibrium 
condition for the physical capital rental market. Recall that we had the 
following first order condition for the physical capital per person k10:
10 For a derivation, see Lee (2010).
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α δ
η
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠1
yr
k                          
(31)
From either (13) or (24), we see that the long run steady state value of 
y/k is just (ξ＋δ )(1＋η )/α . Substituting this into (31), we get the 
following:
  r*＝ξ                               (32)
This is the long run real interest rate r*. Observe that r* is not 
dependent on the energy price px. Hence, it does not matter for the 
determination of r* whether pollution is internalized or not. With ξ＝
0.08, we would have a long run real interest rate of 8%.
B. Cases When the Results Differ
Expecting to have different outcomes depending on whether or not 
agents internalize pollution is natural. The three cases of identical out- 
comes above might be exceptions. The result might be merely an artifact 
of the specificity of our model. We turn to outcomes that are different.
(a) Steady State Level of Per Capita Output, Consumption, Energy Uses, 
Capital Stock, and Pollution
The steady state values of consumption, energy input, output, and 
pollution per effective worker are as follows:
* *
* *(1 )( )[ ( )]c n kαη η ξ δ ρ ξ δ
α θ
− + + −= + − +
            (12)
*
* *( )(1 )[ ]y kξ δ η
α
+ +=
                       (13)
φη=
1
* *1 ( )x k
B                           (14)
1
1




φξ δ −⎛ ⎞+= = ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠                   
(17)
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In addition, the steady state value of the physical capital per effective 
worker is given by:
1
1







−⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠                   (15)
These are the steady state values for the market-based solution. 
When we replace η * in the above expressions with η **, we get steady 
state values for the plan based solution. 
Equations (12) and (13) show that both consumption and output per 
effective worker are increasing in η * for any given value of k̃*. Thus, if 
k̃* is increasing in η *, we can conclude that c̃* and ỹ* are also in- 
creasing in η . Furthermore, considering that x̃* and z̃* given in (14) and 
(17) are directly proportional to k̃*, x̃*, and z̃* are also increasing in η *, 
if k̃* is increasing in η *. Equation (15) suggests k̃* would be increasing 
in η * if α≥φ  holds. (Recall that u* is independent of η *.) Therefore, 
when α≥φ  holds, all the steady state variables c̃*, k̃*, ỹ*, x̃*, and z̃* turn 
out to be increasing in η *. 
Recall that earlier we have shown that η *＞η ** holds. This outcome, 
together with the fact that c̃*, k̃*, ỹ*, x̃*, and z̃* are increasing in η *, 
indicate that the steady state values of the key variables for the plan- 
ner’s problem are smaller than those for the market-based solution. That 
is, the double-starred variables c̃**, k̃**, ỹ**, x̃**, and z̃** are all smaller 
than their single-starred counterparts. The steady state values of con- 
sumption, physical capital stock, output, energy input, and pollution, all 
in terms of per effective worker chosen by the social planner, are smaller 
than their counterparts that would be chosen by citizens.11
(b) Pollution-Output Ratio
Given that z/y＝(z/h )/(y/h )＝z ̃/y ̃ holds, we can easily calculate z/y 










y BD p                        
(33)
11 This shows that we must pay costs to have a cleaner environment. Never- 
theless, we can have a better environment as well as a larger income. See the 
discussion in Chapter IV.
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Equation (33) indicates the long run steady state pollution output ratio 
implied by the market-based solution. Its social planner’s counterpart is 
obtained when we replace px with (px)’ and η * with η **. Given that the 
right-hand side of (33) is decreasing in px, increasing in η *, and η * is 
decreasing in px, the pollution output ratio z/y is decreasing in px. That 
is, whenever the price of energy becomes more expensive, the economy 
would end up lowering pollution energy ratio. The declining pollution out- 
put ratio means that whenever energy resources become more expensive, 
agents tend to adopt behaviors that rely less on energy inputs, thereby 
reducing pollution.
The pollution output ratio becoming smaller with an increase in energy 
price suggests that the pollution output ratio obtained under the plan- 
ner’s choice would be smaller than that obtained under the market-based 
choice. That is, when pollution is internalized, the long run steady state 
pollution output ratio turns out to be smaller than the level that would 
prevail when pollution is ignored. 
The above-mentioned observation implies that when pollution is inter- 
nalized, the long run steady state values of pollution as well as output 
would become smaller than those that would prevail when pollution is 
not internalized. The observation that the pollution output ratio gets 
lower, when pollution is internalized, suggests that when pollution is 
internalized, pollution per person would decline more than output per 
person. 
Another interesting feature of pollution output ratio given in (33) is 
that it is independent of y. Its significance is that when the energy price 
gets higher, the ratio z/y declines. This condition, together with the fact 
that z/y is independent of y, suggest that the ratio z/y becomes smaller 
for all levels of income y, when energy resources become more expensive. 
If we re-interpret this in light of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), 
it means that whenever energy prices go up, the EKC itself will shift 
down. In our model, the social planner pays higher price for energy re- 
sources; hence, his choice would result in the EKC located below the 
one that would prevail under the market-based solution.12
IV. Implications for Green Growth Policies  
We now investigate the implications of our model for green growth 
12 This concept shows that we do not have to accept a lower income to have 
a better environment.
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policies. For convenience, we will divide our discussion into three groups. 
First, we will discuss how we might induce citizens to behave as if they 
were under the direct influence of the social planner. Second, we will dis- 
cuss how we might alter the long run steady state growth rate. Third, 
we will discuss how we may change the pollution output ratio. 
A. How to Align Private Choices with Public Choices
In our model, the only thing that differentiates private choices from 
public choices is whether the pollution, incurred when energy input is 
used, is fully internalized or not. Private choices ignore pollution, whereas 
public choices do not. 
The energy price faced by private decision makers is px, the globally 
determined price of energy resources. In contrast, the energy price faced 
by a social decision maker is px＋1/BD, which is the private cost plus 
the cost of pollution. Recall that B and D indicate the level of energy- 
related technology and pollution-related technology, respectively. A higher 
B means a given amount of raw energy becomes more productive. A 
higher D means that from the given amount of energy uses, we get less 
pollution. In any case, B and/or D can never be infinitely large. Hence, 
1/BD must be a finite positive number. Therefore, px＋1/BD must be 
higher than px. That is why in the above, the social planner chooses 
economic activities, so that the resulting pollution is smaller than what 
would prevail under private choices. 
If that is the case, then we may induce citizens to behave in exactly 
the same way as they would under the social planner dictum. One pos- 
sible way of doing that is altering the energy price faced by citizens from 
px to px＋1/BD. Another possibility is to force citizens to follow the plan- 
ner’s dictum.
(a) Imposition of an Energy Tax
When an energy tax of 1/BD is added to the market price px, the de 
facto energy price citizens would pay becomes px＋1/BD. When such an 
energy tax is imposed, citizens would behave exactly the same as they 
would do under the planner’s dictum. What is important here is that 
nobody forces citizens to do so. They would voluntarily do so. In addition, 
there is no need to ascertain who emits pollution and how much. Simply 
making energy more expensive is all that is needed. (Of course, finding 
out the right amount of energy tax is by no means an easy task.) Thus, 
energy taxation is a very cost efficient method to align private choices 
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to the public choices.
Meanwhile, we want to point out that the energy price we have been 
considering in this paper is the price of “effective” energy. That is, px is 
the price of BX, not raw energy X. The price of raw energy p̅x we observe 
in the market is obtained as follows:
p̅x＝px B                             (34)
This is the private marginal cost of energy inputs. The social marginal 
cost, which should include the cost of pollution, is then given by p̅x＋
1/D. Note that B no longer appears. In terms of raw energy, the energy 
tax is merely 1/D. 
(b) Promotion of the Pollution Prevention/Treatment Technologies
An alternative method to make the private marginal cost of energy 
inputs equal to the social marginal cost is adopt policies that might lower 
the social cost. The social marginal cost p̅x＋1/D could be brought closer 
to the private marginal cost p̅x, if the technology index D can be made 
larger. Making D larger means improving pollution-related technologies. 
A larger D means that the society would experience less pollution from 
a given amount of energy uses. D is concerned with pollution prevention 
and cleanup technologies.
There are options to improve D (i.e., how to make D larger). We can 
improve D through learning by doing, imitation and improvement, tech- 
nology transfer, and R&D activities. Therefore, policies that would pro- 
mote such activities would make D larger, leading to a reduction in the 
social cost of energy. The reduction in the social cost of energy narrows 
the gap between the private and public cost, and thereby mitigate the 
sub-optimality arising from such gaps. Promoting green technologies, 
green products, and green industries are practical examples of policies 
that can make D larger.
The policy of making D larger (i.e., promoting the development of 
anti-pollution knowhow and technologies, or more generally, promoting 
pro-environment technologies) is not perfect as a policy to eliminate the 
gap between private vs. social marginal cost. The gap will be completely 
eliminated only when the technology D becomes infinitely best (i.e., only 
when D becomes infinite). Needless to say, D becoming infinite is im- 
possible. Furthermore, making D larger is costly. In a more general 
model, we have to weigh the benefits of making D large against the 
costs of doing so. The “optimal” level of D arrived in such model would 
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certainly be finite.
(c) Subsidizing Non-Energy Green Inputs
Among several possible alternatives of making η * equal to η **, we 
have considered only the options for making the denominator of η *, p̅x, 
equal to the denominator of η **, p̅x＋1/D. Altering the numerator so as 
to make η * equal to η ** is another option. This procedure can be done 
by subsidizing the use of physical capital inputs. The subsidy, which can 
be called as investment subsidy, can be determined as the amount ζ 
that solves the following:
ζ δ δ− + +=
+1/x x
r r
p p D                        
(35)
The ζ  value that satisfies Equation (35) is as follows:





p D D p D D                  
(36)
The second inequality reflects the fact that in the steady state, the 
real interest rate is equal to ξ. This condition illustrates that whenever 
an interest rate subsidy of ζ , indicated in (36), is given to the users of 
the physical capital, they will veer away from using x toward using k, 
and thereby bring η * down to η **. This option would make the private 
choices identical to public choices.13
Subsidizing the use of physical capital k amounts to giving subsidies 
for investment in machines that would reduce energy uses, improve 
energy efficiency, and help replace pollution-prone energy sources with 
cleaner and renewable energy sources. Tax credits conferred on green 
investors are good examples of such a subsidy.
(d) Outright Restrictions
A government, if it wants, may force citizens to choose c̃**, k̃**, ỹ**, x̃**, 
and z̃**. For this course of action, various regulatory devices could be 
employed. 
An example of such a policy is allocating quotas for green house gas 
13 Needless to say, the effective real interest rate goes down when the subsidy 
is given.
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emission, and allowing them to trade the quotas. This policy amounts 
to setting targets at x̃** or z̃** for firms, and giving awards when they 
meet the targets, but imposing penalties when they do not meet the 
targets. Firms that exceed the targets, that is, those that reduce energy 
or pollution below the targets, are allowed to sell their unused quotas. 
On the other hand, firms that cannot meet the targets are required to 
make up for the shortage with quotas purchased from others or with 
fines.
The use of forces (i.e., direct controls or interventions) can have im- 
mediate effects that everyone can see. As such, policy makers who want 
to get immediate results favor this policy. This situation would be espe- 
cially evident in an economy that is used to controls and interventions.
However, relying on outright forces is the worst kind of policies. De- 
termining what should be the right level of, say, pollution, would be very 
difficult. Thus, setting targets or giving quotas is a very difficult job. 
Setting the wrong targets is highly likely. In addition, ascertaining whether 
agents really adhere to the targets would be equally difficult. The verifi- 
cation costs tend to be very high. Furthermore, when quantitative restric- 
tions are imposed, agents would invariably try to avoid such restrictions. 
That move would make the policy less effective and incur costs of avoid- 
ing restrictions. 
B. Policies Regarding the Long Run Steady State Growth Rate 





                           
(30)
The parameters of the utility function ρ  and θ  are not easily change- 
able; thus, the key parameter is ξ , the productivity of human capital- 
forming activities. The long run steady state growth rate g* is directly 
proportional to ξ. 
Many economists regard ρ＝0.02 and θ＝2 as good estimates of the 
preference parameters.14 We can take estimates of “returns to schooling” 
as good approximates for ξ . Estimates for the returns are generally in 
the range of 8% to 12%.15 These estimates suggest values of g* ranging 
14 See for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
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from 3% to 5%. They are reasonable estimates for medium-term growth 
rates of per capita income. However, they seem to be somewhat high for 
estimates of the long run steady state growth rate. Perhaps the returns 
to schooling may not be maintained at such high rates. If the latter 
comes down eventually to the 4% to 6% range, then g* would be some- 
where between 2% to 3%, which looks more reasonable.
What is important, though, is that g* is increasing in ξ . The long run 
steady state growth rate g* goes up when the human capital forming 
activities of the society become more productive. The best pro-growth 
policy suggested by our model is a policy to enhance the productivity of 
schooling, training, on-the-job training, and continuing education-related 
activities. Health is an important constituent of human capital; hence, 
raising the productivity of health enhancing activities is important, too. 
Thus, if we want to enhance the growth potential of the economy, 
paying attention to human capital-forming activities so that they would 
become more productive is crucial. 
Notably, g* is independent of energy prices. This concept suggests that, 
as far as g* is concerned, it does not matter whether or not the society 
internalizes pollution. In particular, the concept suggests that internal- 
izing pollution will not decrease the long run growth rate of the economy. 
This matter answers the critical question, “If we want to protect envir- 
onment or prevent pollution, we have to sacrifice economic development. 
Don’t we?” Our answer is “No.” 
Attempts to enhance the broadly defined environmental capital affect 
ξ  adversely would be a different matter. Although we are not sure 
whether this would indeed happen, it is still a possibility, and we have 
to guard against such outcomes. In contrast, if efforts to go green can 
be made in such a way as to make human capital-forming activities 
more productive, the long run growth rate could increase. 
C. Policies Concerning the Pollution Output Ratio
In our model, both y and z would grow at the same rate g* in the 
long run. In the above, g* is invariant to green growth policies. That is, 
the usual kinds of green growth policies will not influence the long run 
steady state growth rate g*. This condition does not imply, however, that 
the ratio z/y, the pollution output ratio, is also independent of such 
policies. We bring Equation (33) here to see the point.
15 See for example, Mincer (1974).
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We have replaced the price of effective energy (BX), px B, with the price 
of raw energy X, p̅x, in moving from (33) to (33)’. The ratio (z/y)* given 
above is the ratio that would prevail under market-based solutions. In 
a similar fashion, we can derive the ratio (z/y)** that would prevail under 
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(37)
A comparison of (33)’ and (37) reveals several interesting facts. First, 
(z/y)** is smaller than (z/y)*, for all values of p̅x, and other parameters. 
The ratio (z/y) is increasing in η . Recall that η  is decreasing in energy 
prices. Therefore, higher energy prices would make the ratio (z/y) smaller 
first through their effect on η  and, second, through their direct negative 
effect on. Considering that (z/y)** is determined under higher energy 
prices than (z/y)*, the former should be smaller than the latter. This 
outcome suggests that when pollution is taken into account, we would 
have a smaller pollution output ratio. As pointed out in the previous 
section, this outcome also means that the social planner’s solution 
would entail the EKC located everywhere lower than its counterpart 
that would ensue under market-based solutions.
Policies that would make private choices identical to the social choices 
are also policies to make the pollution output ratios identical. Thus, 
environment (energy) taxes and environment-related technological pro- 
gresses would not only bring y* and z* to their two-starred counterparts, 
but would also bring (z/y)* to (z/y)**. 
D. Policies that May Affect the Long Run Steady State Values of 
Output and Pollution Per Capita
(a) The Steady State Values Restated
We want to understand how the two important variables, output and 
pollution per person, behave in the steady state. The steady state level 
of output per effective worker is determined as follows:16
16 This is derived by combining Equations (13) and (15).
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We have already derived the long run steady state value of u* as fol- 
lows:
* nu ρ ξ θξ θ
θξ
− + −=
                        
(11) 
(b) Comparative Analyses
Equations (38) and (11) clearly show that the real price of energy px 
together with parameters A, ρ , θ , ξ , n, and δ , crucially affect the deter- 
mination of ỹ*. (Recall that η * is decreasing in px.) Among these param- 
eters, preference parameters ρ  and θ  are not easily changed, and the 
population growth rate or the depreciation rate is regarded as exogenous 
to our model. Thus, A, ξ, and px are important for our purposes.
Given that y＝ỹh, we can deduce how y would evolve from the 
knowledge of how ỹ and h evolve. ỹ→ ỹ* and h grows at the rate of g*. 
Therefore, from the knowledge on how ỹ* and g* are determined, we can 
deduce how y evolves. The relevant information contained in Equations 
(38), (11), (16), and (30) reveals the following.
The per capita income y is increasing in A. Therefore, if A can be 
repeatedly made bigger, y would keep on growing. When this occurs, 
then the observed economic growth rate g would surely increase.
When ξ  increases, that is, when human capital creation becomes more 
productive, ỹ* declines but g* goes up. As learning becomes more pro- 
ductive, people would devote more efforts to human capital formation. 
This move means a decrease in the efforts allocated to output production. 
Hence, y decreases as ξ  gets larger. However, when ξ is raised, income 
would grow faster. Therefore, an increase in ξ  would make the current 
income smaller, but make the future income much larger.
17 This is derived by combining Equations (17) and (15).
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The per capita income y is a decreasing function of the energy price 
px. Thus, when the real price of energy falls, y would increase. If px keeps 
on falling, y would keep on increasing, raising the observed growth rates. 
In the latter half of the 20
th century, the real price of energy kept on 
falling except for the oil shock years of the 1970s and 1980s. This event 
may partly explain the long run prosperity that people all over the world 
have enjoyed since the 1960s. Of course, the event could explain why 
during the oil shock years, the world average economic growth rate was 
lowered.
Equations (39) and (11) clearly show that the real price of energy px 
together with parameters A, ρ , θ , ξ , n, and δ , crucially affect the deter- 
mination of z̃*. (Recall that η * is increasing in ξ.) In addition, the tech- 
nology parameters B and D affect z̃* directly. Among these parameters, 
B and D are particularly important as policy targets.
Improvements in B or D have definite effects. First, they do not affect 
income. Second, when B or D improves, pollution would definitely de- 
crease. Hence, when improvements in B or D are made, the pollution 
per person would decrease, whereas the output per person will not be 
affected. A reduction in pollution is desirable; thus, improving environment- 
related technologies B and D can be an important component of the 
green growth initiatives.
Nevertheless, we also want to have a larger income, together with a 
decrease in pollution. According to our model, the only way is to make 
improvements in the overall productivity A and the environment-related 
productivity B and/or D. That is, when we promote the conventional 
R&D so that the economy becomes more productive and simultaneously 
promote the green R&D so that the economy becomes environmentally 
more productive, we can have a larger income together with a smaller 
pollution.18
(c) Energy Prices Are Crucial
One thing becomes clear. If the energy prices are kept arbitrarily low 
for whatever reason, people would use too much energy and create too 
much pollution. The low energy price policy is very detrimental to envir- 
onment, because it increases the per capita pollution.
The meaning of keeping the energy prices low has two aspects. One 
has to do with subsidies and tax breaks given to users of energies. Sub- 
18 Generally, improving A, B, or D is a costly business. When we subtract such 
costs, we may end up having a smaller income.
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS82
sidies and tax breaks would make the user cost of energy lower than 
its marginal cost of supply. This lower price would induce people to use 
up more energy resources. The other has to do with pollution externality. 
When we use energy resources, we create pollution. Nevertheless, in most 
cases pollution is external to private decision. Polluters simply do not 
take pollution into account. This phenomenon means that the social 
marginal cost of energy uses is higher than their private marginal cost.
V. Further Discussion and Concluding Remarks
We have proposed and studied a growth model that incorporates the 
environmental aspects as essential components. As a sequel to Lee 
(2010), the current research focuses on policy options that can induce 
economic agents, who tend to ignore damages they are creating to the 
environment, to behave more responsibly toward the environment. The 
key issue is how to induce citizens to fully internalize pollution they are 
creating and simultaneously enhance the growth potential of the econ- 
omy. That is, our main concerns are finding out pragmatic policy options 
to foster green growth― growth whose processes and outcomes are green, 
and growth powered by greens. Our key findings are as follows.
As general principles, we point out two. First, not under-pricing the 
environment-related goods and services is crucial. For instance, the dis- 
torted energy price structure currently in place in many countries en- 
courages people to use too much energy, thereby creating too much pol- 
lution. Therefore, phasing out subsidies and tax breaks should become 
the first priority. Moreover, the pollution costs associated with economic 
activities are generally not reflected in the prices of environment-related 
goods and services. This phenomenon makes people use too much envir- 
onmental resources and create too much pollution. Thus, pricing envir- 
onmental resources correctly is very important.
Second, by promoting repeated improvements in the overall productivity 
level of the economy, in resource-saving technologies and pollution pre- 
vention/cleanup technologies, we can achieve the twin goals of green 
growth: raising income and reducing pollution. Furthermore, if technol- 
ogical breakthroughs are made repeatedly, income growth rate could be 
raised, and pollution growth rate could be lowered. Resource-saving tech- 
nologies include technologies that can produce the same amount of out- 
put with fewer resources, technologies that can make the distribution 
and uses of resources more efficient, resource-economizing knowhow and 
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technologies, better recycling technologies, and technologies related to 
renewable sources of energies, to name a few. These are the so-called 
“green technologies.”
As a practical guide, we have studied several policy options that can 
induce citizens to behave more responsibly toward the environment. To 
discourage unnecessarily large amounts of resource uses, we can impose 
surcharges or taxes on energy resources. To encourage the advancement 
of pollution prevention/cleanup (or, more generally pro-environment) 
knowhow and technologies, we can provide subsidies (and other forms 
of help) for the relevant R&D sector. To encourage the use of cleaner 
inputs, we can provide subsidies (and other forms of help) for clean in- 
puts. These are market-based policy options. Mixing the three options 
is better. This way, the energy tax can be imposed at a modest rate, 
and tax revenues thus mobilized can be used to finance the subsidy 
schemes.
We have also studied the policy option of imposing an outright re- 
striction on energy uses (or more generally, on activities that hurt the 
environment.) The idea is to force citizens to choose the same outcomes 
as the outcomes that would prevail under the planner’s solution. Regu- 
lation, controls, and interventions are practical means for outright restric- 
tions. On-site inspection, verification, and imposing penalties or confer- 
ring rewards will be needed. These are very cost-ineffective means. 
The policy option of “allocating quotas for green house gas emission 
and allowing free trade of the quotas as rights” is an example of out- 
right restriction policies. Of the two parts of the policy, allowing the 
trading of the rights is market-friendly and sensible. However, the al- 
location of quotas or rights is a very tricky business. Coming up with a 
market-friendly allocation rule would be difficult.
Being a very simple model, there are many limitations in our model. 
For a better model, we have to amend the present model in several im- 
portant directions.
First, although the most important determinant for the long run steady 
state growth rate in our model is the productivity of the human capital- 
forming activities, we have treated it very lightly. By exploring how to 
make the education/training system of a country more productive, we 
can shed light on this issue. This concern is intimately related to that 
of reforming the education system of the country. Further development 
of the model in this direction is clearly needed.
Second, we have to overcome the limitation of the one-sector model. 
With the one-sector model of this research, we cannot address important 
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issues, such as brown industries vs. green ones, brown technologies vs. 
green ones, and brown workers/jobs vs. green workers/jobs. At a min- 
imum, a two-sector model is needed to examine these issues.
Even in our model, we can investigate how the long run growth is 
affected when the industrial structure changes from an energy-intensive 
brown one to an energy-saving green one, by slightly altering our pro- 
duction function as follows:
1[ (1 )( ) ] ( )Y A bK b BX uhL
α
φ φ αφ −= + −                  (40)
We can represent the change in industrial structure by varying the 
parameter b: A larger a means a shift toward a more energy-saving in- 
dustrial structure.
Third, there is a need to extend the model so that we can deal with 
issues of introducing entirely new technologies or products that are hith- 
erto nonexistent. For green growth to succeed, coming up with new green 
technologies and products that can be engines of green growth is very 
important. An expanding variety model of Ethier (1982) or Romer (1987, 
1990), or a quality model of Aghion and Howitt (1992), could be utilized 
for this purpose.
Fourth, we can easily extend the model toward an open economy ver- 
sion. We can then deal with international trade issues other than energy 
resource importation. The international diffusion of green technologies 
can then be dealt with, too.
Fifth, the main difference between private vs. public choices arises 
from the difference in the targets that are being optimized. We have 
studied this issue by focusing on the difference in the profit functions. 
The social planner includes the cost of pollution as an important part 
of the total cost, whereas individual firms do not do so. As an alterna- 
tive to this strategy, we can approach the problem by focusing on the 
difference in the utility function. In this case, citizens would ignore 
pollution in their welfare considerations, whereas the social planner will 
include it as an essential component of the social welfare function. For 









( / ) 1Max
1
n t c ze dt
                   
(41)
   EXAMINING A GREEN GROWTH MODEL FOR POLICY IMPLICATIONS 85
Subject to:
c＋k ̇＝y－(n＋δ )k－px (Bx)                    (42)
where
1[ (1 )( ) ] ( )Y A bK b BX uh
α
φ φ αφ −= + −                 (43)
= +
1 2
1 1z x y
D D                          (44)
Equation (41) differs from the utility function we examined in this 
research in that in place of the usual consumption per person c, we 
have the consumption/pollution ratio. This is the simplest way to in- 
clude pollution as a bad in the utility function. It is not the usual con- 
sumption c but the consumption pollution ratio that enters the utility 
function. The consumption pollution ratio c/x stands for “true” goods 
consumed. 
Equation (42) is the usual budget constraint we have had for private 
decision makers. This budget constraint is different from that for the 
social planner: the latter subtracts the cost of pollution and maximizes 
the net profit. That is, for the social planner, the net output (y－z) was 
the available resources for consumption, investment, and energy costs. 
In (42), the gross output y is the available resource. Of course, we can 
treat (y－z) or some portion of it as the available resource.
Equation (43) is a slightly extended production function mentioned in 
(40) expressed in per capita terms. Finally, Equation (44) is a slightly 
extended pollution-generating function. We have one more source of 
pollution: production, delivery, and uses of y do generate pollution, too. 
As long as we stick to a linear function, utilizing a pollution function 
such as (40) will not pose difficulties. D2 stands for the knowhow and 
technology concerning pollution prevention/cleanup associated with final 
output y.
Sixth, we have not studied the transition process of the economy 
moving toward from the initial position toward the long run steady state. 
Thus, we cannot say anything about whether the economy will actually 
move toward the steady state, and if so, at what speed and in what 
manner. Likewise, we cannot say anything useful about the transition 
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from one steady state to another steady state in response to policy inter- 
ventions, for example. This is a serious drawback, and it must be square- 
ly dealt with. We leave it as a future task.
(Received 11 February 2011; Revised 17 August 2011; Accepted 24 
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